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Abstract
Recent literature shows that, when international ﬁnancial trade is ab-
sent, optimal policy deviates signiﬁcantly from strict inﬂation targeting,
but when there is trade in equities and bonds, optimal policy is close to
strict inﬂation targeting. A separate line of literature shows that collateral
constraints can imply that cross-border portfolio holdings act as a shock
transmission mechanism which signiﬁcantly undermines risk sharing. This
raises an important question: does asset trade in the presence of collateral
constraints imply a greater role for monetary policy as a risk sharing de-
vice? This paper ﬁnds that the combination of asset trade with collateral
constraints does imply a potentially large welfare gain from optimal policy
(relative to inﬂation targeting). However, the welfare gain of optimal policy
is even larger when there is no international asset trade (but collateral con-
straints bind within each country). In other words, the risk sharing role of
asset trade tends to reduce the welfare gains from policy optimisation even
when collateral constraints act as a shock transmission mechanism. This is
true even when there are large and persistent collateral constraint shocks.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyses optimal monetary policy in a world where there is interna-
tional trade in equities and bonds and borrowers are subject to collateral con-
straints. The combination of international asset trade and collateral constraints
adds an important new element to the cross border eﬀects of monetary policy.
In a recent contribution to the literature on optimal monetary policy in open
economies, Corsetti et al (2010, 2011) show that ﬁnancial market incompleteness
(in the extreme form of ﬁnancial autarky or bond-only economies) can imply large
welfare gains from monetary policy optimisation relative to inﬂation targeting.
They show that the absence of international ﬁnancial trade creates a strong welfare
role for monetary policy as a risk sharing device. Senay and Sutherland (2016) on
the other hand show that trade in equities and bonds, while still short of ﬁnancial
completeness, tends to reduce the gains from monetary policy optimisation very
signiﬁcantly. The risk sharing provided by trade in equities and bonds thus appears
to be suﬃcient to allow optimal monetary policy to focus on inﬂation stabilisation.
Both Corsetti et al (2010, 2011) and Senay and Sutherland (2016) analyse
models where the only form of ﬁnancial market imperfection is the absence of a
full set of state contingent assets. In a separate line of literature Devereux and
Yetman (2010) and Devereux and Sutherland (2011b) analyse the implications
of collateral constraints.1 They show that collateral constraints, in conjunction
with international trade in equities and bonds, can imply that asset trade causes a
signiﬁcant increase in shock transmission across countries. This is because cross-
border collateral constraints imply that “ﬁre sales” of assets in one country (which
are required to meet the collateral constraint) cause parallel ﬁre-sales (and asset
price declines) in the other country. This shock transmission mechanism can
signiﬁcantly undermine the risk-sharing properties of equity and bond trade.
The fact that collateral constraints can oﬀset the risk sharing beneﬁts of asset
trade creates the possibility that monetary policy re-emerges as an important
risk sharing device in a model which combines collateral constraints with trade
in equities and bonds. Indeed, given that asset trade may now act as a shock
transmission mechanism, an interesting question is whether asset trade enhances
1Devereux and Yetman (2010) and Devereux and Sutherland (2011b) develop two country
models where ‘borrower’ households in each country are subject to collateral constraints in the
form assumed in the literature initiated by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
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(rather than reduces) the role of monetary policy as a risk sharing device.
This paper develops a more general version of the Devereux and Sutherland
(2011b) model which incorporates variable capital and sticky nominal prices. We
show that asset trade in combination with collateral constraints does indeed im-
ply non-trivial gains from monetary policy optimisation relative to strict inﬂation
targeting. We ﬁnd that the optimal monetary rule implies a strong feedback on
the spread between equity returns and the return on borrowing. Thus optimal
monetary policy tends to stabilise the credit spread. It also tends to reduce inef-
ﬁcient ﬂuctuations in the amount of real capital that are triggered by collateral
constraints.
However, when we consider a case which combines collateral constraints with
ﬁnancial autarky, we ﬁnd that there are even larger welfare gains from policy
optimisation. This latter result shows that asset trade is welfare improving and
implies lower welfare gains from policy optimisation even when there are collateral
constraints. In other words the risk sharing role of asset trade outweighs its role
in shock transmission. This is true even if collateral constraint shocks are very
large and persistent or if the credit spread is very sensitive to shocks.
A key feature of the Devereux and Sutherland (2011b) model is that, within
the collateral constraint, borrowers have a portfolio choice over home and foreign
capital. The combined eﬀect of the portfolio and collateral constraint therefore
creates a transmission channel for shocks to pass from one country to the other.
The full analysis of optimal policy within this model must therefore combine wel-
fare analysis of monetary policy with optimal portfolio choice by borrowers. Senay
and Sutherland (2016) show how this can be done in a model without collateral
constraints. An important contribution of this paper is to extend this analysis to
a model with collateral constraints.2
This paper proceeds as follows. The model is described in Section 2. We brieﬂy
illustrate the dynamic properties of the model in Section 3. Our speciﬁcation of
2We solve the model assuming that the collateral constraint is always binding. Devereux
and Yu (2014) and Devereux et al (2015) analyse related models where the collateral constraint
is assumed to be occasionally binding. Devereux and Yu (2014) analyse the positive and wel-
fare implications of international ﬁnancial integration. In particular, they show how ﬁnancial
integration in the presence of collateral constraints can have both risk sharing and shock trans-
mission eﬀects. Devereux et al (2015) analyse optimal monetary and capital control policy in
anticipation of and response to sudden stops.
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monetary policy and welfare is described in Section 4 and our approach to solving
for equilibrium portfolios and optimal policy is outlined in Section 5. The results
are presented and discussed in Section 6 while Sections 7 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
There are two countries, home and foreign. As in Devereux and Sutherland
(2011b), in each country there are two types of households, borrowers and savers.
Borrowers are less patient than savers. Borrowers hold capital which they rent to
intermediate goods ﬁrms. Savers also hold real capital but, crucially, they are only
able to use it directly to produce intermediate goods using a technology which is
less productive than that available to intermediate goods ﬁrms. Borrowers are
subject to a collateral constraint. In our simulations we choose values for discount
rates and technology to ensure that the collateral constraints are always binding
(in the steady state).
Final goods are produced using intermediate goods as the only input. Final
goods are produced by imperfectly competitive ﬁrms which are subject to Calvo
(1983) pricing.
2.1 Borrowers
Borrower  in the home country maximizes a utility function of the form
 = 
∞P
=0
+
1−+()
1−  (1)
where   0 () is the consumption of borrower household  and  is the
discount factor, which is determined as follows
++1 = ¯+ (1 + +)−   = 1 (2)
where 0    , 0  ¯  1,  is aggregate home consumption of borrowers.3
In the benchmark version of the model we assume that borrower households
can hold capital located in either country. In this case the ﬂow budget constraint
3Following Schmitt Grohe and Uribe (2003),  is assumed to be taken as exogenous by
individual decision makers. The impact of individual consumption on the discount factor is
therefore not internalized.
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of the home country borrower household is
 −  +  + ∗
= −−1−1 + (1− )−1 + −1 (3)
+(1− )∗−1 + ∗−1
where  is home capital owned by borrowers,  is the foreign capital owned
by borrowers,  is the price of home capital goods (in terms of ﬁnal goods), ∗
is the price of foreign capital goods (in terms of ﬁnal goods),  is the real rate
of interest on borrowing and  and ∗ are the rental rates of home and foreign
capital (in terms of ﬁnal goods).  is the depreciation rate of real capital. It is
assumed that all labour is supplied by saver households so borrower households
have no labour income.
Borrowing is subject to the collateral constraint
 ≤  ( + ∗) (4)
where  = ¯ exp(ˆ) where 0  ¯  1 and ˆ = ˆ−1 +  0 ≤   1 and 
is a zero-mean normally distributed i.i.d. shock with  [] = 2
The ﬁrst order conditions for borrowers imply
− = 
£
+1−+1+1
¤
+  (5)
− = 
£
+1−+1+1
¤
+  (6)
− = 
£
+1−+1+1
¤
+  (7)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the collateral constraint and
+1 =
[(1− )+1 + +1]

+1 =
£
(1− )∗+1 + ∗+1
¤
∗
are the rates of return on home and foreign capital.
Notice that the borrower has a portfolio decision to make over the composition
of the capital holdings located in the two countries. Equations (6) and (7) can be
combined to yield the following optimality condition for portfolio allocation

£
+1−+1
¡
+1 − +1
¢¤
= 0 (8)
As shown by Devereux and Sutherland (2011b), despite the presence of the col-
lateral constraint, this condition is in a form which allows the application of the
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Devereux and Sutherland (2011a) portfolio solution methodology. The application
of this solution methodology will be discussed in more detail below.
Notice also that if the collateral constraint is not present the Lagrange multi-
plier, , would be zero in equations (5), (6) and (7). This implies that, up to a
ﬁrst order approximation, 
£
+1
¤
=  [+1], i.e. the rate of return on capi-
tal is equated to the cost of borrowing. The presence of the collateral constraint
breaks this equality and therefore introduces a premium, or a spread, between the
return on capital and the cost of borrowing, thus 
£
+1
¤
− [+1]  0. It is
useful to deﬁne
 = 
£
+1 −+1
¤
to be the "spread". The monetary policy rule speciﬁed below will include a feed-
back term that responds to this spread.
In the analysis reported below we also consider a version of the model were
there is no international trade in ﬁnancial or real assets. In this alternative case
borrowers can only hold capital located in their own country. The home budget
constraint therefore takes the form
 −  + 
= −−1−1 + (1− )−1 + −1 (9)
and the collateral constraint is
 ≤ 
In this alternative formulation of the model borrower households do not have any
portfolio decision and equations (7) and (8) are irrelevant.
2.2 Intermediate goods ﬁrms
Intermediate producers use the following technology
 = ¯1−−1


where  = +∗ is the stock of home capital owned by home and foreign
borrowers (and rented to ﬁrms),  is labour input and ¯ is total factor
productivity and  is determined as follows
log() =  log(−1) + 
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where 0 ≤   1 and  is a zero-mean normally distributed i.i.d. shock with
 [] = 2
Proﬁts are given by
 −  − 
where  is the price of intermediate goods (in terms of ﬁnal goods),  is the real
wage rate (in terms of ﬁnal goods) and  is the rental rate of home capital.
Total capital used by intermediate goods ﬁrms is the sum of home capital
owned by home and foreign borrowers, i.e.
 =  +∗
The ﬁrst order conditions for employment of labour and capital are
 =  (1− ) ¯−−1


 = ¯1−−1
−1

2.3 Savers
Home country saver household  maximises a utility function of the form
 = 
∞P
=0
+
1−+()
1−  (10)
where   0   0, () is the consumption of saver household  and  is the
discount factor, which is determined as follows
++1 = ¯+ (1 + +)−   = 1 (11)
where 0    , 0  ¯  1,  is aggregate home consumption of savers. Savers
are assumed to be more patient that borrowers so ¯  ¯
The ﬂow budget constraint of the home country saver household is
 +  +  = −1−1 + (1− )−1
+ +  + Π (12)
 is the capital stock owned by savers,  is the output of intermediate goods
produced by savers and  is the labour supply of savers (which is assumed to
be exogenous and constant). Π is the proﬁts of capital producing ﬁrms plus the
proﬁts of ﬁnal goods producers.
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Savers produce intermediate goods using the following technology
 = ¯1−−1
where total factor productivity is ¯ and  is a shock (deﬁned above) which is
common to both borrower and saver production technologies.
In the benchmark version of the model we assume that the market for bor-
rowing and lending is integrated across the two countries. Equilibrium therefore
implies
 + ∗ =  +∗
The ﬁrst order conditions for savers imply
− = +1−+1+1 (13)
− = +1−+1+1 (14)
where
+1 =
h
(1− )+1 + +1(1− )¯+1−
i

is the rate of return on capital owned by savers in the Home country.
Equilibrium in the market for borrowing and lending implies
 [+1] = 
£
∗+1
¤
(15)
In an alternative version of the model we assume that the market is segmented
across the two countries so equilibrium in the two separate markets for borrowing
and lending implies
 =  ∗ = ∗
2.4 Capital producers
Final goods are converted into real capital by perfectly competitive proﬁt max-
imising ﬁrms and sold at price  where the cost of producing  units of real capital
is given by
 +z()
in terms of ﬁnal consumption goods where z(0) = 0 z0()  0 z00()  0. We
assume
z() = 
2
¡
 − ¯
¢2
¯
7
where ¯ is steady state .
The ﬁrst order condition for producers of capital goods is
 = 1 + 0()
and the capital stock follows the following accumulation process
 + = (1− ) (−1 +−1) + 
The proﬁts of capital goods producers are paid to saver households.
2.5 Final goods consumption
We deﬁne  ( =  ) to be consumption basket which aggregates Home and
Foreign ﬁnal goods according to:
 =
"
1
2
1


−1

 +
1
2
1


−1


# 
−1
(16)
where  and  are baskets of individual home and foreign produced ﬁnal goods.
The elasticity of substitution across individual goods within these baskets is   1.
The parameter  in (16) is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods. Note that the home and foreign baskets are equally weighted so there is
no ‘home bias’ in preferences.
The price index associated with the consumption basket  is
 =
∙
1
2
 1− +
1
2
 1−
¸ 1
1−
(17)
and where  is the price index of home goods for home consumers and 
is the price index of foreign goods for home consumers. The corresponding prices
for foreign consumers are  and  
Note that the terms of trade for the home country can be deﬁned as follows
 = 
2.6 Final goods producers
Each ﬁrm in the ﬁnal goods sector produces a single diﬀerentiated product. Sticky
prices are modelled in the form of Calvo-style contracts with a probability of re-
setting price given by 1− . We assume producer currency pricing (PCP).
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If ﬁrms use the discount factor Ω to evaluate future proﬁts, then ﬁrm  chooses
its prices for home and foreign buyers, () and () in home currency
to maximize

∞P
=0
Ω+
½
+()
[()− +]
+
+ +()
[()− +]
+
¾
(18)
where () is the demand for home good  from home buyers and  () is the
demand for home good  from foreign buyers and  is the price of the intermediate
good.
Proﬁts of ﬁnal goods ﬁrms are paid to saver households.
2.7 Aggregation and Market clearing
Total home demand for ﬁnal goods is
 =  +  +  +z()
where home demand for home ﬁnal goods is given by
 =
1
2

µ

¶−
and foreign demand for home ﬁnal goods is given by
 =
1
2
∗
µ ∗
 ∗
¶−
Equilibrium in intermediate goods market implies
 +  =  + 
where  and  are measures of price dispersion in ﬁnal goods markets.
2.8 Portfolio allocation
Apart from the existence of the collateral constraint, a key distinguishing feature
of the above model, that sets it apart from much of the existing literature on
optimal monetary policy in open economies, is that it allows for international
trade in multiple assets. Recently developed solution techniques (Devereux and
Sutherland, 2011a) make it possible to solve for equilibrium portfolio allocation
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in models of this type and Devereux and Sutherland (2011b) show how these new
techniques can be employed in the case where a collateral constraint is binding.
It is simple to show that the borrower’s budget constraint and the home and
foreign collateral constraints can be re-written so that the borrower’s portfolio
decision appears in a format consistent with the Devereux/Sutherland approach.
Using the deﬁnitions of  and  the borrower budget constraint can be written
as follows
 + ∗ −
= −1−1 + ∗−1−1 −−1−1 − 
Deﬁne  and ∗ to be the total capital holdings of respectively home and foreign
borrowers, i.e.
 =  + ∗ ∗ = ∗ + ∗∗
and deﬁne  to be the share of foreign capital in the home borrower’s portfolio
 =
∗
 + ∗
so the budget constraint becomes
 − = −1 +
¡
 − 
¢
−1−1 −−1−1 −  (19)
Note that home and foreign holdings of capital must sum to home and foreign
capital stocks, i.e.
 =  +∗ ∗ =  +∗
so
∗ =  + ∗∗ −
The home and foreign collateral constraints can now be written in terms of  as
follows
 ≤  ∗ ≤ ∗
¡
 + ∗∗ −
¢
(20)
The budget constraint written in the form of (19) is in a format which allows
the Devereux/Sutherland approach to be applied while the collateral constraints
in the form of (20) do not contain any portfolio allocation variables. Portfolio
variables therefore only appear in the borrower’s budget constraint (as assumed in
the Devereux/Sutherland approach). Note that in (19) the portfolio excess return
is given by ¡
 − 
¢
−1−1
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3 Inﬂation Targeting and the Dynamic Response
to Shocks
Before we describe our approach to evaluating welfare and analysing optimal policy
it is useful ﬁrst to describe the properties of the above model in the case where
monetary policy is exclusively focused on targeting producer price inﬂation. We
discuss the properties of the model with reference to the impulse response functions
in Figures 1 and 2. These impulse responses are based on the benchmark parameter
set shown in Table 1.
The parameters of the discount factors are chosen to imply a steady state
discount rate of approximately 1% per quarter for savers and 1.5% for borrowers.
Following Devereux and Sutherland (2011b) and Mendoza and Smith (2006) 
is set equal to 0.022. The trade elasticity, , is set equal to 1.5, which matches
the value in Backus et al (1992). The share of real capital in production is set
equal to 0.3 for both borrowers and savers, whereas steady state TFP (¯ and
¯) is assumed to be unity for intermediate goods ﬁrms and 0.5 for savers (thus
implying that borrowers have access to a more productive technology than savers).
The depreciation rate of real capital, , is set at 0.025 while the parameter of the
adjustment cost function, , implies a standard deviation of investment which is
approximately twice that of output. The Calvo pricing parameter, , is set at
0.75 and the elasticity of substitution between individual goods, , is set equal
to 10. These values are typical in the New Keynesian literature. The collateral
constraint parameter, , is set at 0.75, which matches the value used in Devereux
and Sutherland (2011b). The parameters of the shock processes for TFP and the
collateral constraint are those used in Devereux and Sutherland (2011b) (which
are based on Jermann and Quadrini, 2009).
Impulse responses to the two shocks (TFP and the collateral constraint) are
shown in Figures 1 and 2. The line marked with triangles in each plot shows the
impulse response in the benchmark case (i.e. where there is international trade in
equity and bond markets). The line marked with circles in each plot shows impulse
responses in the alternative case where there is no international ﬁnancial trade. In
both these cases collateral constraints are assumed to be binding. For comparison
each plot also shows (marked with asterisks) the case where there is international
trade in equities and bonds but where collateral constraints are absent.
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Table 1: Benchmark Parameter Values
Discount factors ¯ = 0988 ¯ = 1027  = 0022
Elasticity of substitution: individual goods  = 10
Risk aversion  = 1
Trade elasticity  = 15
Steady state TFP ¯ = 1 ¯ = 05
Share of capital in production 1−  = 1−  = 03
Depreciation  = 0025
Capital adjustment costs  = 02
Calvo price setting  = 075
Collateral constraint parameter ¯ = 075
TFP shocks  = 09  = 0005
Collateral constraint shocks  = 09  = 0011
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Figure 1 shows the eﬀect of a positive TFP shock in the home country. In
the absence of the collateral constraint the TFP shock raises output, investment,
consumption and equity prices. The rise in investment leads to a gradual rise in
the capital stock for both savers and borrowers.
The collateral constraint (both with and without international asset trade)
tends to magnify these eﬀects. The rise in equity prices eases the collateral con-
straint and causes a shift of real capital from savers to borrowers. The rise in
borrowing puts upward pressure on the real interest rate while the rise in equity
prices implies a downward shift in expected equity returns. The spread between
equity returns and borrowing therefore falls. The overall eﬀect of the collateral
constraint is to create a ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect which magniﬁes the eﬀect of
the shock on investment. There is also a small magnifying eﬀect on output.
The main contrast between the cases with and without ﬁnancial trade are in
terms of the cross country eﬀects. In the case where there is no international
asset trade the main impact of the shock, and the ampliﬁcation eﬀect of the
collateral constraint, is concentrated on the home country. Thus equity prices rise
more in the home country than the foreign country, there is a larger eﬀect on the
spread in the home country than in the foreign country and larger shift of capital
from savers to borrowers in the home country than in the foreign country. This
contrasts with the case where there is international asset trade. In this latter case
the ampliﬁcation eﬀect of the collateral constraint is quite evenly spread across the
two countries. This reﬂects the transmission eﬀects of the collateral constraint.
The rise in equity prices in the home country eases the collateral constraint for
both home and foreign borrowers (because both home and foreign borrowers hold
home equity). This allows both home and foreign borrowers to acquire more
capital in both home and foreign countries and this implies that the initial shock
(and the ampliﬁcation eﬀect of the collateral constraint) is transmitted to both
countries.
Figure 2 shows the impulse response to a collateral constraint shock to the
home country (i.e. a shock to  in equation (4)). Collateral constraint shocks are
obviously only relevant in the case where the collateral constraint exists so Figure
2 shows only two plots, representing the cases with and without international asset
trade (and a binding collateral constraint). Figure 2 shows that a positive shock
to  (which represents an easing of the collateral constraint) leads to an initial
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rise in the home equity price, a rise in the cost of borrowing, a fall in the rate of
return of equities and a fall in the credit spread. There is a consequent shift in
real capital from savers to borrowers and a rise in output. These eﬀect all go into
reverse as the shock decays.
The main contrast between the cases with and without asset trade is again in
terms of the transmission of the shock between countries. When there is trade
in assets the easing of the collateral constraint in the home country allows home
borrowers to expand their holdings of both home and foreign capital. The rise
in home equity prices also eases the collateral constraint of foreign borrowers and
they are also able to expand their holdings of both home and foreign capital. These
eﬀects imply that a shock to the home collateral constraint is quite evenly spread
across the two countries when there is asset trade but are strongly concentrated
on the home country when there is no asset trade.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how the collateral constraint both acts as an ampli-
ﬁcation mechanism and as a source of shocks. The ﬁgures also illustrate how the
collateral constraint can become a cross country transmission mechanism when
there is international asset trade.
4 Welfare and the Monetary Policy Rule
The particular welfare measure on which we focus is the unconditional expectation
of aggregate period utility. For the home economy this is deﬁned as follows
 =  
1−
1−  (21)
where time subscripts are omitted to indicate that this is a measure of uncondi-
tional expectation. Damjanovic et al (2008) argue that unconditionally expected
utility provides a useful alternative to Woodford’s (2003) ‘timeless perspective’
when analysing optimal policy problems. For the purposes of this paper, uncondi-
tional expected utility provides a simple and convenient way to compute welfare
in a context where portfolio allocation is endogenous. The next section provides
a more detailed discussion of the complications that arise in the simultaneous
computation of welfare and equilibrium portfolios.
Welfare in each country is the sum of borrower and saver utility
 =  + 
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where
 = 
1−
1−   = 
1− ()
1− 
Because there two types of households in each country (i.e. savers and bor-
rowers), monetary policy may have distributional consequences. This implies that
welfare comparisons between monetary policy rules are more complicated than is
the case in standard open economy models. To overcome this problem we choose
a simple and natural principle, which is to restrict attention to monetary policy
rules which are (weakly) Pareto improving relative to strict inﬂation targeting, i.e.
rules which are (weakly) welfare superior to inﬂation targeting for both saver and
borrower households.
In common with Corsetti et al (2010, 2011) and much of the previous literature
we focus on co-operative policy in the sense that policy rules for each country are
simultaneously chosen to maximise global welfare, i.e. the sum of the home and
foreign welfare measures.
We model monetary policy in the form of a targeting rule. In general the
optimal targeting rule is model dependent. Corsetti et al (2010, 2011) show that
the optimal targeting rule typically includes measures of inﬂation and a number of
welfare gaps. Because of the complicated interaction between policy and portfolio
choice we do not derive the fully optimal policy rule for our model. Instead we
postulate that the optimal rule can be approximated in the following form
(ˆ − ˆ−1) +  ( − −1) + ( − −1)
+( − −1) + ( −−1) (22)
+( −−1) + ( −−1) = 0
where , ,  and  are deﬁned as follows
 = ˆ − ˆ 
 = ˆ − ˆ 
 = −
³
ˆ − ˆ∗
´
 = −
³
ˆ − ˆ∗
´
 = −
³
ˆ − ˆ∗
´
− 
³
ˆ − ˆ∗
´
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and where a hat over a variable represents its log deviation from the non-stochastic
steady state and the superscript  indicates the ﬁrst best value of a variable.
Thus  is a measure of the output gap and  is a measure of the terms of trade
gap. As will be explained in more detail below,   and  are measures of
the deviation from full risk sharing. There is an analogous targeting rule for the
foreign economy.
The targeting rule in (22) contains seven terms. The ﬁrst term depends on
producer price (PPI) inﬂation. The central role of inﬂation stabilisation in optimal
policy in New Keynesian models is a well-known consequence of staggered price
setting. In essence, staggered price setting implies that inﬂation causes distortions
in relative prices between goods. Inﬂation is thus (other things equal) welfare
reducing.
The second term in (22) measures the welfare-relevant output gap. Again the
role of the output gap in optimal targeting rules in New Keynesian models is
well-known and needs no further explanation.
The third term in the targeting rule measures the welfare-relevant terms-of-
trade gap. As Corsetti et al (2010, 2011) explain in detail, in an open economy,
because there are diﬀerent baskets of goods produced in diﬀerent countries, shocks
may have distortionary eﬀects on the relative price of these diﬀerent baskets.
These distortions are welfare reducing in the same way as the within-country
price distortions generated by inﬂation are welfare reducing. The terms of trade
gap therefore plays the same role in the monetary policy rule as the PPI inﬂation
term.
The fourth term in (22) measures the impact of the credit spread. In the
absence of the collateral constraint the credit spread is zero. The size of the credit
spread therefore captures the welfare distortion that is caused by the presence
of the collateral constraint and the fourth term in the targeting rule captures
the welfare trade-oﬀ between using monetary policy to stabilise the credit spread
relative to other welfare gaps.
The ﬁfth, sixth and seventh terms in the targeting rule are measures of devi-
ations from full risk sharing. These terms capture the welfare reducing eﬀects of
incomplete ﬁnancial markets. (Corsetti et al (2010, 2011) refer to this "demand
imbalances".) To understand these terms note that, if a complete set of ﬁnancial
instruments were available for trade (within and between countries), equilibrium
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in ﬁnancial markets would imply that the ratio of marginal utilities (for savers and
borrowers) across countries would equal the relative price of consumption baskets,
i.e.
∗−
−
=
∗−
−
= 1
and the ratio of marginal utilities across savers and borrowers within each country
would be constant, i.e.
−
−
= 
∗−
∗−
= ∗
where  and ∗ are constants. In terms of log-deviations these conditions imply
−
³
ˆ − ˆ∗
´
= 0
−
³
ˆ − ˆ∗
´
= 0
−
³
ˆ − ˆ
´
= 0
−
³
ˆ∗ − ˆ∗
´
= 0
It is thus clear that   and  in (22) are measures of deviations from full
risk sharing. And it is clear that these terms in the monetary policy rule capture
the extent to which monetary policy is adjusted in order to achieve greater risk
sharing.
The seven terms in the policy rule capture a range of potential welfare trade-
oﬀs that feature in the optimal setting of monetary policy. Internal (i.e. with-in
country) trade-oﬀs are captured by the inﬂation term, the output gap, the credit
spread and the risk-sharing gap between savers and borrowers. External (i.e. open
economy) trade-oﬀs are captured by the terms of trade and demand imbalances.
The object of the analysis presented below is to determine the optimal values of
the parameters of the policy rule and thus to determine the role of asset market
trade and collateral constraints in the optimal setting of monetary policy.
5 Portfolio Choice and Model Solution
Our objective in this paper is to analyse optimal monetary policy in the above
speciﬁed model. As already explained, a key distinguishing feature of the above
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model is that it allows for international trade in multiple assets. This paper there-
fore uses the portfolio solution techniques developed in Devereux and Sutherland
(2011a).
Combining the analysis of optimal policy with endogenous portfolio choice
presents some new technical challenges. These challenges arise because there is an
interaction between policy choices and portfolio choice. Portfolio choices depend
on the stochastic properties of income and the hedging properties of available
assets. Monetary policy aﬀects the stochastic behaviour of income and the hedg-
ing properties of assets and therefore aﬀects optimal portfolio choice. In turn,
the equilibrium portfolio aﬀects consumption and labour supply choices and thus
aﬀects macroeconomic outcomes and welfare. Thus, in addition to the standard
routes via which policy aﬀects the macro economy, the optimal choice of monetary
policy must take account of the welfare eﬀects of policy that occur via the eﬀects
of policy on portfolio allocation.
Our solution approach follows the recent portfolio literature based on Devereux
and Sutherland (2011a) in computing equilibrium portfolios using a second order
approximation to the portfolio selection equations for the home and foreign country
in conjunction with a ﬁrst order approximation to the home and foreign budget
constraints and the vector of excess returns. In Senay and Sutherland (2016)
we showed how to combine this portfolio solution approach with an analysis of
optimal monetary policy. In this paper we extend this joint analysis to also include
collateral constraints.
As already explained, we model monetary policy as targeting rule (22). We
optimise the choice of parameters in the targeting rule by means of a grid search
algorithm. Each grid point represents a diﬀerent setting of the parameters of the
targeting rule and for each grid point there is an equilibrium portfolio allocation
and a corresponding general macroeconomic equilibrium and level of welfare. We
use the Devereux and Sutherland portfolio solution approach to evaluate the equi-
librium portfolio at each grid point. This equilibrium portfolio is then used to
compute macroeconomic equilibrium and a second order approximation of welfare
at each grid point.
To be speciﬁc, our policy optimisation problem involves a grid search across
the six coeﬃcients of the policy rule in (22), i.e.        and , in
order to identify the parameter combination which maximises the unconditional
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expectation of period welfare (as deﬁned in (120)).4
It should be noted that this methodology does not compute fully optimal policy
because fully optimal policy may involve more inertia than is embodied in the
above speciﬁed targeting rule (as is shown in Corsetti et al (2010, 2011) in some
cases). Our optimal rule is therefore the optimal rule within the restricted class
of rules deﬁned by (22). The focus on a non-inertial targeting rule is a convenient
simpliﬁcation given the extra complications and computational burden arising
from the endogenous determination of equilibrium portfolios.
6 Optimal Policy
6.1 The Benchmark Case
The results for the benchmark set of parameter values listed in Table 1 are shown
in Table 2.
The ﬁgures reported in the ﬁrst column show the results for the case where
there is trade in both equities and bonds and the collateral constraint binds. The
ﬁrst six rows in the table show the coeﬃcients of the optimised policy rule. Note
that, judging from the size of the optimised coeﬃcient, the credit spread appears
to be a particularly signiﬁcant term in the optimal policy rule. The seventh
row in Table 2 shows the welfare gain from the optimal policy rule relative to
strict inﬂation targeting. This welfare gain is measured in terms of percentage
equivalent steady state consumption units so the gain from policy optimisation is
approximately 0.11% of steady state consumption.
The eighth row in Table 2 shows the portfolio share of foreign equity in the
home portfolio when policy is set optimally. So, in the benchmark case, the home
country has a very small bias (i.e. has a portfolio weight just over 50%) towards
foreign equity (and the foreign country has an identical bias towards home equity).
The remaining rows of Table 2 compare the volatility of a number of variables
arising from optimal policy and inﬂation targeting. Optimal policy implies that
the standard deviation of PPI inﬂation is 0.12% per quarter (compared to 0 in
the case of inﬂation targeting). Optimal policy implies a very small reduction in
4Given that the model is symmetric, the foreign country has a similarly deﬁned targeting rule
and the coeﬃcients of that rule are assumed to be identical to the coeﬃcients of the home rule,
with appropriate changes of sign.
19
the volatility of the output gap and a somewhat larger reduction in the volatility
of the credit spread. The latter eﬀect obviously reﬂects the signiﬁcance of the
coeﬃcient on the credit spread in the optimised policy rule.
The eﬀects of optimal policy relative to inﬂation targeting are further illus-
trated in the impulse responses plotted in Figures 3 and 4. The line marked the
circles in each panel shows the impulse response in the case of inﬂation targeting
for the benchmark case while the line marked with the triangles shows the impulse
response when policy is set according to the optimal rule. Figure 3 shows the re-
sponse to a TFP shock and Figure 4 shows the response to a collateral constraint
shock. Figures 3 and 4 show that optimal policy tends to dampen the response
of the credit spread, equity prices, the return on equity and the real return on
borrowing. It also tends to stabilise investment and the capital stock held by both
borrowers and savers.
The second column in Table 2 shows the results for the case where the col-
lateral constraint binds but there is no international trade in equities or bonds.
The coeﬃcients of the optimised policy rule are quite similar to the case with
international asset trade but it is now apparent that the welfare gains from policy
optimisation are signiﬁcantly higher than in the case with asset trade. The welfare
gain from optimisation is now approximately 0.21% of steady state consumption,
which is almost twice the welfare gain when there is asset trade.
The volatility results reported in the second column of Table 2 show that
optimal policy marginally reduces the standard deviation of the output gap and
the terms of trade gap and, as in the asset trade case, has a more signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the volatility of the credit spread.
As a further point of comparison the third column in Table 2 reports results
for the case where there is asset trade but where there is no collateral constraint.
In this case the optimal policy rule is only marginally diﬀerent from inﬂation
targeting and the welfare gains from optimisation relative to inﬂation targeting
are virtually zero.
A comparison of the ﬁrst and third columns of Table 2 shows that the presence
of a binding collateral constraint has quite a signiﬁcant impact on optimal pol-
icy. There are non-trivial welfare gains from optimal policy (relative to inﬂation
targeting) when there is a collateral constraint. But the welfare gains are trivial
when there is no collateral constraint.
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A comparison of the ﬁrst and second columns of Table 2 shows the impact
of asset trade on the welfare gains from optimal policy. In the context of this
model, where the collateral constraint creates a channel for the transmission of
shocks from one country to another, a relevant question is whether asset trade
results in a greater role for active policy in order to oﬀset real shocks. The fact
that the optimal policy rule is quite similar in the cases illustrated in columns one
and two in Table 2, while the welfare gain from policy optimisation is lower in
column 1 than in column 2, suggests that asset trade tends to reduce the role of
monetary policy optimisation in the face of real shocks. In other words, the shock
transmission mechanism created by the collateral constraint does not oﬀset the
risk sharing beneﬁts of asset trade.
As outlined above in the introduction, Corsetti et al (2010, 2011) show that
imperfect asset markets imply that optimal monetary policy should deviate from
inﬂation targeting in order to improve risk sharing. Senay and Sutherland (2016)
show that this role declines sharply when there is trade in bonds and equities. De-
vereux and Sutherland (2011b) show that trade in bonds and equities can create a
strong shock transmission mechanism when combined with a collateral constraint.
As explained above, this raises the question of whether asset trade may increase
the role of monetary policy rather than reduce it, when combined with a collat-
eral constraint. The results reported in Table 2 suggest that this is not the case.
However, these results show an important role remains for monetary policy even
when there is trade in equities and bonds (in contrast to the results reported in
Senay and Sutherland (2016)).
6.2 Parameter variations
Table 3 shows the welfare results for a number of parameter variations.
The ﬁrst row shows a case where the trade elasticity,  is less than unity.
The welfare diﬀerence between optimal policy and inﬂation targeting is shown for
the same three asset market structures as reported in Table 2 for the benchmark
case. The welfare diﬀerences are almost identical to the benchmark case so it
appears that the value of  has no signiﬁcant quantitative or qualitative eﬀect on
the welfare comparison.
The second, third and fourth rows of Table 3 show cases where, respectively,
the variance of collateral shocks is larger than the benchmark case, the persistence
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Table 2: Benchmark Results
Equity trade
w ith collateral
constraint
F inancia l autarky
w ith collatera l
constra int
Equity trade
w ithout collatera l
constra int
Policy rule  −0068 −0616 0
 0 −0250 0
 −0301 −0300 0
 −0007 −0001 0
 −0042 0007 −0018
 0014 0013 0
Welfare diﬀerence 0108 0211 000004
Portfolio share 05014 − 05013
Standard Deviations
CPI Inﬂation (optimal) 012 016 00011
Output gap (optimal) 00086 0012 00
(inf tar) 00096 0013 00
ToT gap (optimal) 0 0011 00
(inf tar) 0 0012 00
Spread (optimal) 042 059 00
(inf tar) 047 066 00
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of collateral shocks is higher than in the benchmark case, and the variance of
collateral shocks is set to zero (so the only source of shocks is TFP). It is apparent
that the presence, size and persistence of collateral shocks have signiﬁcant eﬀects
on the size of the welfare diﬀerence between optimal policy and inﬂation targeting.
The larger and more persistent are collateral shocks the larger are the welfare
diﬀerences. But it is also apparent that the ordering and relative size of the welfare
diﬀerences when compared across ﬁnancial market structures is little aﬀected by
the size and persistence of collateral shocks. In all three cases the welfare diﬀerence
is very small when there is no collateral constraint (i.e. column 3) and the welfare
diﬀerence is much larger in the case of ﬁnancial autarky (when combined with the
collateral constraint) than in the case of asset trade (combined with the collateral
constraint), i.e. the comparison between columns 2 and 1. Thus the general
qualitative conclusions stated in the benchmark case appear to be unaﬀected by
the size and persistence of collateral constraint shocks.
The ﬁfth row of Table 3 shows a case where capital adjustment costs (repre-
sented by the parameter ) are higher than in the benchmark case. This is an
interesting case to consider because the more costly it is to vary the total capi-
tal stock the more important is the transfer of the existing capital stock between
savers and borrowers in response to shocks. A higher value for  will therefore
tend to magnify the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀects of collateral constraints. The
welfare diﬀerences shown in row ﬁve of Table 3 conﬁrm that the welfare beneﬁts
of policy optimisation are higher than in the benchmark case. However, as with
the other parameter variations shown in Table 3, the ordering and relative size of
the welfare diﬀerences across ﬁnancial market structures are very similar to the
benchmark case.
The last row of Table 3 shows a case where the steady state leverage ratio is
higher than that in the benchmark case (i.e.  is higher). This tends to reduce the
welfare beneﬁts of policy optimisation (relative to inﬂation targeting) but again
does not appear to alter to relative ranking of welfare beneﬁts when compared
across ﬁnancial market structures.
All the parameter variations shown in Table 3 thus appear to conﬁrm the
conclusions illustrated in the benchmark case.
23
Table 3: Parameter variations: welfare diﬀerence
Equity trade
w ith collatera l
constraint
F inancia l autarky
w ith collateral
constraint
Equity trade
w ithout collatera l
constra int
Low trade elasticity
( = 085)
0108 0210 0000009
Larger collateral shocks
(= 0022)
0416 0826 000004
More persistent collateral shocks
(= 095)
0124 0258 000004
No collateral shocks
(= 0)
00064 00072 000004
Higher capital adjustment costs
( = 10)
0300 0558 000003
Higher steady state leverage
( = 08)
0248 0483 000004
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7 Conclusion
This paper examines the implications of collateral constraints and international
trade in equities and bonds for optimal monetary policy. Previously Corsetti et
al (2010, 2011) have shown that, when international ﬁnancial trade is absent,
optimal policy deviates signiﬁcantly from strict inﬂation targeting, while Senay
and Sutherland (2016) show that, when there is trade in equities and bonds,
optimal policy is close to strict inﬂation targeting. Thus opening up international
trade in equities and bonds tends to eliminate the role of monetary policy as a
risk sharing device.
In a separate line of literature Devereux and Sutherland (2011b) show that
collateral constraints can imply that cross-border portfolio holdings act as a shock
transmission mechanism which signiﬁcantly undermines risking sharing. This
raises the possibility that asset trade in the presence of collateral constrains im-
plies a greater role for monetary policy as a risk sharing device. This paper ﬁnds
that the combination of asset trade with collateral constraints does imply a poten-
tially large welfare gain from optimal policy (relative to inﬂation targeting). Thus
collateral constraints do tend to create a role for monetary policy as a risk sharing
device even when there is trade in equities and bonds. However, the welfare gain
of optimal policy is even larger when there is no international asset trade (but
collateral constraints bind within each country). In other words, the risk sharing
role of asset trade tends to reduce the welfare gains from policy optimisation even
when collateral constrains act as a shock transmission mechanism. This is true
even when there are large and persistent shocks to the collateral constraint.
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Figure 1: TFP shock, comparison of financial market structures
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Figure 2: Collateral constraint shock, comparison of financial market structures
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Figure 3: TFP shock, optimal policy versus inflation targeting
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Figure 4: Collateral constraint shock, optimal policy versus inflation targeting
